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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Between February and September, 2005, Respondent Howard 
Houston was lured into making eight separate investments in Wood River Partners, L.P ("Wood 
River"), totaling $2.75 million. Whittier was the general partner and manager of Wood River, a 
national investment which he based in Blaine County. Whittier misled investors and co~ntnitted 
securities fraud in operating Wood River. Whittier and Wood River were sued by the Securities 
and Exchange Co~nmission in New York, which filed its action to remove control of Wood River 
from Whittier and place it into receivership. Whittier was also indicted by a federal grand jury in 
New York and prosecuted by the United States for criminal securities fraud for his Wood River 
activities. Whittier pled guilty to three felony counts in the U.S. District C o w  for the Southern 
District of New York in February, 2007, and is currently serving a federal prison sentence for his 
crimes. Houston sued Whittier in Blaine County, alleging Whittier's violation of the Oregon 
Securities Laws, which prohibit the offering and sale of securities in Oregon by means of 
misrepresentations and omissions. In October, 2007, Houston moved for summary judgment on 
two of his six claims for relief. The motion was granted and final judgment was entered in favor 
of Houston in March, 2008. This appeal followed. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. Houston filed his complaint on August 30,2006. R. p 5. 
Whittier initially answered, challenging personal jurisdiction over him in Idaho, even though he 
was a resident of and served with the complaint in Blaine County. Whittier then filed an Answer 
to the Complaint on December 7,2006. R. p. 37 - 62. In the Answer, Whittier did not admit or 
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deny any allegation in the complaint other than to admit that Wood River had been placed into 
receivership by a federal district court in New York. Id. As to all other allegations, Whittier 
asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which he claimed arose out of 
the civil action that was filed against him by the Securities and Exchange Commission (separate 
from the criminal indictment filed against him by the United States). R. pp. 38 - 61. 
In February, 2007, Whittier pled guilty to three of the four felony charges against him in 
the New York felony indictment. R., Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Banks Declaration, Exhibit C, p. 17) . 
Ten months after the guilty plea, on October 30,2007, Houston filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R. p. 85-86. Houston argued during the summary judopent proceedings 
that he was entitled to partial summary judgment on the first and second claims for relief for two 
reasons: (1) Whittier's guilty plea prevented Whittier from denying that he had made certain 
misrepresentations about Wood River; and (2) Whittier had never denied the factual allegations in 
this case, and did not present any evidence controverting Houston's submissions. R. p. 89, 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion For 
Partial Su~nmary Judgment, pp. 2-3 (included as Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Motion to Augment 
Record). Houston's motion was supported by an Affidavit of Howard Houston, and Declaration 
of Robert S. Banks, Jr., and exhibits, which were filed and received without objection. Clerk's 
Exhibits 1, 2 (identified at R. 177). 
On January 14,2008, nearly three months after Houston filed his motion for partial 
summary judgment, Whittier filed a memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment 
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together with the Affidavit of John Whittier. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion to Augment 
Record, Exhibits 1, 2. Whittier's Affidavit in opposition to surnmary judgment was olily six 
paragraphs, and did not coiltravene any of the facts offered in support of Houston's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Whittier's memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment 
raised for the first time his argument that the Oregon law did not apply to this case. 
Houston filed a Reply Memorandum on January 22,2008, together with a Declaratioli of 
Peter Shames. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion to Augment Record, Exhibit 2; R. p. 102- 
104. Those documents were filed and served on Whittier's counsel on Januay 22,2008. The 
Shames Declaration was filed to address Whittier's new contention that the Oregon law was 
inapplicable. 
On January 24,2008, Whittier filed a motion to strike the Shames declaration and the 
reply brief. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 4. Whittier contended that the reply 
brief and Shames Declaration had been filed and served one day late. He further contended that 
the Shames Declaration was not an affidavit, and included inadmissible hearsay statements. 
On January 28, 2008, the district court held a hearing on (1) Houston's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint; and (3) 
Whittier's Motion to Strike Houston's Reply Memorandum and the Shames Declaration. At that 
hearing, Houston moved the court to replace the Shames Declaration with the Affidavit of Peter 
Shames, which contained the identical sworn declaration statement of Mr. Shames, but was in 
affidavit format. 
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On February 1, 2008, the district court signed an interim Order which (1) denied 
Whittier's motion to file an amended answer; (2) granted Whittier's motions to strike the 
declarations of Shames and Banks, but granted Houston's motions to substitute affidavits for the 
declarations; (3) granted Whittier until February 14,2008, to file any response to the Shames 
Affidavit; and (4) denied Whittier's motion to strike the reply brief. R. 110-1 13. 
The February 1,2008 Order also made the following findings of fact and based upon 
uncontradicted facts submitted by Houston: 
a. that Houston made eight investments in Wood River from February, 2005 through 
September, 2005, totaling $2,750,000; 
b. that the sale of the Wood River securities to Houston was made by untrue statements of 
material fact and onlissions to state material facts, and that Houston was unaware of those untrue 
statements and omissions; 
c. that during the times that Houston made his purchases, Whittier was a managing 
partner, officer and/or director of Wood River. R. 1 10-1 13. 
The February 1,2008 Order reserved for further proceedings the question of wl~ether 
Oregon or Idaho law applied to the sales of Wood River to Houston, and invited further briefing 
on that issue. Id. 
The parties filed further briefs on whether the Oregon law applied on February 21 and 
February 26,2008. Whittier filed a Memorandum in Support of the Application of the Idaho 
Uniform Securities Act. R. p. 114 - 123. Houston filed Plaintiffs Menlorandurn Regarding 
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Application of Oregon Law, R. p. 130 -138, and Affidavit of Robert S. Banks, Jr. in Support of 
Entry of Final Judgment, R. p. 139-143. 
Whittier also filed objections to the form of the judgment that Houstoll had proposed. R. 
144-153. In his objections, Whittier contended that the "tender requirement" of the securities 
laws requires delivery of tile securities to the defendant, with no obligatiolls of the defendant to 
pay for the securities. Whittier also contended in that motion that plaintiff only sought s m l a r y  
judgment on the issue of liability, not damages. Id Houston filed a Reply Memorandum to 
Whittier's objections. R. p. 154-160. 
The district court held the hearing by telephone on February 27,2008. After hearing 
argument from the parties and considering the briefs, the district court issued an Order on Entry of 
Judgment on March 19,2008. In that Order, the district court made specific findings, and 
concluded that the Oregon securities law applied to Houston's claims, and that Houston had 
satisfied the tender requirement of the securities laws by sending a letter in which Houstoi~ 
tendered the securities upon payment of the amount of the judgment. R. p. 161-1 65. The Order 
determined that the entry of summay judgment in favor of Houston was appropriate. R. p. 163. 
The district court also made the following specific findings: 
a. The Affidavit of Howard Houston filed on October 30, 2007 clearly set forth the 
amount of Houston's investments, and that the amounts and dates were never controverted by 
Whittier. R. p. 161. 
b. Houston moved for summary judgment on the first and second claims for relief, and 
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never limited his motion for partial summary judgment to liability issues. R. p. 162. 
c. Houston had satisfied his obligations to tender the securities back to Whittier by doing 
so conditional upon payment. The district court rejected Whittier's argument that Houston must 
actually send his rights and title in Wood River to Whittier in federal prison without any 
obligation on Whittier's part to pay for it. The court also noted that there was no evidence that 
Whittier paid for or even offered to pay for Houston's Wood River interest (and in fact Whittier 
has not satisfied any of the judgment as of this writing). R. p. 163. 
The district court then entered a Final Judgment in favor of Houston for $3,234,881 on 
March 19,2008. R. p. 166-67. 
I-iouston filed an unopposed lnotion for dismissal of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth clainls 
for relief, which were not subject to the partial summary judgment motion, which was granted on 
March 25,2008. R. p. 169-70. 
Wittier then timely filed this appeal. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts. 
1. Wittier was the general partner of Wood River from February, 2003 through the Fall 
of 2005. R., Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Banlts Declaration, Exhibit C, lines 20-21). In addition, Whittier 
was the principal and managing member of the general partner for Wood River, Wood River 
Associates, LLC. Whittier was also the managing member of Wood River Capital Management, 
LLC, which was responsible for administrative matters for Wood River. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2 
(Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exhibit B, p. 3). 
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2. On or about June 2004, Whittier and Wood River issued a Confidential Private 
Offering Memorandum ("Offering Memorandum"), which set forth the tenns of Wood River and 
its investment program. Plaintiff Howard Houston was sent a copy of that Offering 
Memorandum. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Howard Houston, 1 3, Exhibit B). 
3 In addition, Whittier and Wood River prepared a Confidential Summary of the Wood 
River investment. Plaintiff Howard Houston was sent a copy of that document as well. Id., 1 2, 
Exlibit A. 
4. The Confidential Summa~y stated that Wood River would: 
A. Be a diversified investment that would be "Flexible and Nimble" and would use 
"Bottom Up Fundamental Research , Sector Selection and Technical Analysis." Id., Exhibit A, p. 
2. 
B. Be diversified with a focus on the media, communications, health care, biotechnology, 
financial services, technology and internet, telecommunications, consumer staples, and consumer 
cyclicals sectors. Id. 
5 Likewise, the Offering Memorandum represented that the Wood River investment 
would be a balanced and diversified investment designed to limit losses. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2 
(Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exhibit B,) The Offering Memorandum specifically represented 
that Wood River would: 
A. Achieve capital appreciation through the combination of long and short equity 
investments in a diversified number of industries. Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exlibit B, pp. 
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B. Malce "broad based" investments. Id.. 
C. "[Tlypically hold 30-40 long positions." Id. 
D. Cap all long positions at "1 0% of the original cost" and cap all short positions at "5% 
of the original cost." Id. at p. 11. 
E. Deliver "consistent absolute returns for its limited partners." Id. 
F. Base its investment strategy on fundamental research, as well as both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis." Id. 
6. Ln late 2004, Houston was solicited to make an investment in Wood River. R. Cleric's 
Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Howard Houston, 7 2,3. Houston received a copy of the Offering 
Memorandum and the Confidential Summary. Id. 
7. Houstoll reviewed the Wood River materials he received with his assistant, Peter 
Shames. Based on representations made in the Offering Memorandum and Confidential Summary, 
Mr. Houston agreed to invest in Wood River. Affidavit of Howard Houston qj 4. 
8. Although the Offering Memorandum stated that tlie minimum investment was 
$1,000,000, Mr. Whittier allowed Mr. Houston to make an initial contribution of $250,000, with 
the understanding that he would make additional contributions if Houston was satisfied with Wood 
River's performance. Affidavit of Howard Houstol~ 7 5. 
9. Mr. Houston invested in Wood River in the following amounts by delivering funds to 
Wood River's bank account at the First Bank of Idaho in Ketchum, Idaho: 
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February 2005 $250,000 
March 2005 $250,000 
April 2005 $500,000 
May 2005 $250,000 
June 2005 $250,000 
July 2005 $500,000 
August 2005 $250,000 
September 2005 $500,000 
Mr. Houston's total cash investment in Wood River was $2,750,000. Afidavit of I-Ioward 
Houston 7 6. 
10. Houston agreed to make his colltributions after February, 2005 based upon his 
understandillg that the investment parameters for Wood River as described to him had not changed, 
and upon his understanding that the fund was performing well. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 1 
6, 7, 9, 10. 
11. Houston received periodic performance reports from Whittier and Wood River. Each 
of the reports he received represented that the fund was making money, and was well diversified. 
None of the reports ever suggested that the fund was concentrated in any particular security or 
securities. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 6,7, 9, 10. For example, Houston's assistant, Peter 
Shames, received a Wood River report from Whinier dated July 26,2005 which listed the top five 
holdings of Wood River, and stated that they represented 4-5% of all of Wood River's Holdings. 
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They included Microsoft, Sirius Satellite, and E-Bay. That July report also represented that the 6th 
through 10th biggest holdings represented 3-3.5% of Wood River's holdings. Those stocks 
included such well known stocks as Yahoo! Endwave was not listed anywhere in the top ten 
holdings. Affidavit of 13oward Houston 7 8, Exhibit C. Endwave was only listed in the Top 10 
small capidistressed holdings, which were identified as "weighted 2-2.5%" of the total Wood River 
portfolio. Id. 
12. Whittier's representations about Wood River's holdings and performance were false. 
Wood River's July, 2005 brokerage statements that the Securities and Exchange Commissioll 
obtained indicate that, at the end of July, 2005, the Endwave position at Wood River was 
5,150,523 shares. The Endwave shares were worth approximately $180 million, and comprised 
65% of Wood River's assets under managemelit. At that time, which was the date Whittier sent 
the report to Houston described in the previous paragraph, Wood River owned more than 45% of 
all outstanding shaves of Endwave. R., Clerk's Exhibit l(Banks Declaration, Exhibit D. 
(Declaration of Charles Joshua Felker In Support Of Plaintiffs Application For Entry Of An Order 
Granting A Prelilniilary Injunction), f/ 22. ). 
13. Endwave was no Microsoft. It was a sinall cap technology company that admitted in 
its March, 2005 Form 10K filing that "We have had a history of losses. We had a net loss of $4.4 
million in 2004. We also had net losses of $31.0 million and $7.9 rnillio~l for the years ended 
December 3 1,2002 and 2003, respectively." Banks Declaration, Exhibits E, F (2004 l0K and 
2005 10K SEC filings). In fact, Endwave never had never reported a profitable year. It was also a 
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small public company. Its March 4,2004 Form 10K filing reported that it had only 108 employees 
Id. 
14. Endwave was also a volatile stock. It traded in ranges from less than $10 to over $50 
per share while Whittier was accuinulating it. It was also thinly traded. Except during the times 
that Whittier was acquiring it, its total daily trading volume of both purchases and sales was less 
than the 5 million shares that Wood River secretly owned. Banks Declaration, Exhibit G. 
(Endwave perfo~mance and volume chart). In other words, there was no visible market for the 
Endwave shares if Wood River desired or needed to sell them. 
15. Mr. Houston had never heard of Endwave while he was investing $2.75 lniilion in 
Wood River. Houston was unaware that Wood River was so concentrated in Endwave. Had he 
known that, he would not have considered an investment into Wood River. Affidavit of Howard 
Houston 7 10. 
16. By mid-September, representatives of BNP Paribas (BNP), a large iilstitutional 
investor in Wood River, had been pressing Wood River Partners and Whittier to redeem a $49 
million investment BNP had made on behalf of a customer. BNP had given notice of its 
redemption on June 29, the redemption amount was determined as of July 29, and the redemption 
payment had come due at the end of August. Whittier was unable to meet that redemption request. 
See Banks Declaration, Exhibit D (Declaration of Charles Joshua Felker In Support Of Plaintiff's 
Application For Entry Of An Order Granting A Preliminary Injunction, 7 26-27). 
17. Whittier never told Houston that Wood River was unable to meet redemption requests 
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of its investors. Whittier accepted Houston's $1.25 nlillion contribution to Wood River from July 
through September, 2005, while Wood River was so illsolvent it could not fill the redemption 
request. Had Housto11 been told that Wood River was illiquid and concentrated in Endwave stock, 
he would not have invested $1.25 millioll in that time period. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 7 
10. 11. 
18. After Whittier was unable to meet redemption requests for BNP and other investors in 
Wood River, the Securities and Exchange Comlission filed a civil lawsuit against Whittier and 
the Wood River entities for fraud, injunctive relief, and to place Wood River into receivership. A 
federal court in New York placed Wood River into receivership in November, 2006, and it 
remained there to the time of the entry of judgment in this case (and is still pending as of this 
writing). Banks Declaration, Exhibit A. (Order For Injunctive Relief in Securities and Exchange 
Coi~znzission v. Wood River Capital Managei~zent, et al, No 05 CV 8713 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
19. A federal grand j u y  issued a criminal indictment against Whittier in February, 2007 in 
UnitedStates ofAi~zerica 1). John H. Whittier, No. 07 Crim. 087 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 1,2007). Banks 
Declaration, Exhibit B (Indictment). The indictment charged four cou~ t s  of securities fraud in 
connection with the failure to disclose the Media Bay and Endwave positions to illvestors; and 
failure to report holdings of Media Bay in excess of 10% of the outstanding stock; and failure to 
r e p o ~  holdings in excess of 5% and 10% of Media Bay stock, another stock in which Wood River 
was overconcentrated. Id. 
20. On May 30,2007, Whittier pled guilty to three of the four counts in the indictment. He 
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pled guilty to Counts 1 , 2  and 4 of the indictment. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of 
Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17). 
21. Count 1 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier created and iniplemented a 
scheme to defraud Wood River investors by: (1) acquiring more than 70% of the stock of Endwave 
without disclosing that fact to investors; (2) falsely representing to Wood River investors that he 
would pursue a broad investment strategy in which no one holding would comprise more than 10% 
of Wood River's assets; and (3) falsely representing to Wood River iilvestors that the fund was 
being audited by outside investors. Balks Declaration, Exhibit B. (Indictment 7 9 ). Whittier pled 
guilty to this count. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 
17). 
i 22. Count 3 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier acquired more than 10% of the 
I outstanding stock of Endwave and failed to disclose that ownership, contrary to SEC rules. B a k s  
Declaration Exhibit B, Indictment at qj 51. Whittier pled guilty to this count. Banks Declaration, 
i 
I Exhibit C. (Transcript of Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17). 
I 
I 23. Count 4 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier also acquired for Wood River 
i a large position in a company called Media Bay that was more than 20% of all of the outstanding 
I 
stock of Media Bay. Further, Whittier did not disclose to the investing public or Wood River 
I 
i investors his position in an effort to defraud investors. B a k s  Declaration Exhibit B, Indictment at 
i qqj 53, 54. Whittier pled guilty to this count. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of 
I 
Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17). 
j 
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I 
24. 111 entering his plea of guilty to counts 1, 3 and 4 of the indictment against him, 
i 
I Whittier stated under oath in open court that: 
j 
I was general partner of Wood River Partners from 2003 tlrcough the fall of 2005 
I and Wood River Offshore .from July of 2005 through the fall of 2005. 
capacity I engaged in wrongful conduct, including intentionally concealing the 
size of mv beneficial ownership position in a public companv called Endwave 
1 Corporation. I purchased and sold Endwave stock knowin0 that the true-the 
truth regarding my Endwave holdings was material information that was not 
publicly lmown. 
As general partner of both funds, I misled mv investors in several wavs. For 
example, I knowinglv and intentionally failed to cause the timely filing of 
forms with the SEC pursuant to Rules 13d-1 and 16a, disclosing that I 
beneficiallv owned in excess of 5% and 10%" res~ectivelv, of shares of 
Endwave. 
I 
Further, the undisclosed concentrated position in the Endwave securitv far 
exceeded the maximum cap for a single stock provided for in the funds !sic1 
I stated investment parameters. 
i In addition, in the summer of 2005. I caused a false filing of a schedule 13D-G form, which did not accurately disclosed the complete and beneficial 
ow~nership I had of a companv called Media Bav. At the time of the filing I 
I 
i knew that this was material information. 
I I knew at the time that I was doing wrong. I've embarrassed myself and my family 
I and caused hann to my investors. 
i 
i Banks Declaration, Exhibit C, (Transcript of proceedings at 14-15). 
I 
25. On December 7,2006, Whittier filed an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial, in which 
, 
1 he refused to answer any of the allegations in the Complaint. R. p. 37-63. Wittier based his 
I refusal to answer a31d his invocation of the Fifth Amendment on the basis that there was a federal 
I 
i 
civil lawsuit filed against Whittier by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whittier did not 
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mention the criminal indictment filed against him by the United States in seeking to invoke his 
Fifth Amendment Privilege. 
26. Whittier did not offer any evidence to refute any of the followillg facts in Plaintiff's 
Complaint: 
A. Whittier controlled the Wood River investment. R. 7, f j  6; 
B. IHouston received written information about Wood River which made certain 
representations. R. 9-1 1, f j  12 - 16. 
C. Houston invested $2.75 million in Wood River based upon those representations. R. 
11-12,fj 18; and 
D. The documents Houston received about Wood River included material 
misrepresentations and onlined to state material facts. R. 12- 16, qfj 19-2 1. 
27. Whittier did not offer any evidence to refute Houston's sworn statement in his 
affidavit that he was unaware of the multiple n~isrepresentations and omissioi~s Whittier had made 
to induce him to invest in Wood River. /fj 4, 7-12. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are set forth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 6 -7. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Houston requests attorney fees on this appeal pursuant to ORS 59.115(10), which provides 
that "the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action under" ORS 
59.1 15, the statute under which the district court granted summary judgment. Houston did not 
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move the court for attorney fees in the district cowt in order to save time and expense. Now that 
Whittier has forced him into another court proceeding, he requests his reasonable attorney fees 
incurred on this appeal. In deciding the attorney fee issue on appeal, Houstoll respectfully requests 
that this Court take into consideration Whittier's coilduct in the district court in addition to the 
filing of this appeal. In addition, Houston requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. $ 12-120, relating 
to coinmercial transactions, and 5 12-121, on grounds that the appeal is frivolous. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Houston agrees with the general standards of review described in Appellant's Brief at 9. 
However, as to the issue of whether the district court erred in pern~itting the filing of the Reply 
Memorandum and the Shames Affidavit, tl-ie correct standard of review is abuse of discretioil. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c)("court may alter or sl-~orten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good 
cause shorn"); Berzrzett 1). Bliss, 103 Idaho 358,360,647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1982). 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HOUSTON'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE WHITTIER OFFERED NO FACTS TO 
CONTRAVENE THE ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
HOUSTON. THEKE WERE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE 
This appeal can largely be decided by applying the facts described above to the familiar 
standards in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (e). Rule 56(c) provides that summary 
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judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) provides: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against the party. 
See also: State ex rel. Departnzent ofLabor & Indus. Seniices. v. Ifill, 118 Idaho 278,284 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1990)(applying Rule 56(e)). 
Here, Houston set forth a detailed statement of facts in his Complaint. R. pp. 6-16. Jil 
moving for sumlary jud-pent, he filed contemporaneous sworn statements of Howard Houston 
and Robert S. Banks Jr. Clerk's Exhibits 1,2. Houston's affidavit in particular describes the 
representations that Whittier and the offering materials made, which convinced hiin to invest $2.75 
millioll over eight montl~s. Houston's statement further describes how Wluttier sent out supposed 
progress reports showing a positive performance of Wood River that contained outright lies. The 
attachmeiits to the Banks Declaration, particularly Exhibits A and D, detail what was actually 
occurring at Wood River. Clerk's Exhibit 1 
Whittier neither objected to nor offered evidence in any form to contravene the record filed 
by Houston. Whittier had ample opportunities to do so. He was served with Houston's summary 
judgment motion on October 31,2007. When Whittier responded on Ja~iuay 14,2008, he filed an 
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affidavit in response to Houston's summary judgment motion. However, it was only six 
paragraphs long, and did not dispute a77y of the facts that Houston had offered in support of his 
motion. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 2. After the summary judgment hearing 
on January 3 1, The district court's interim Order granted Whittier a11 additional two weeks to file 
any affidavits in opposition to the Shames Affidavit. R. p. 110-1 13. Whittier again failed to offer 
any facts to create a genuine issue of any material fact upon which the s m a r y  judgment motion 
was based. 
As Houston pointed out in the district court: 
Therefore, regardless of any issues relating to presunzptions and the 
FVth Anzendnzent,regardless of the doct~dines of issue preclusion and 
clainz preclusion, and regardless of ~1hetherWhittier is perinitted to 
Jile an amended answer: there are sinzply no facts in dispute. Wood 
River was sold by means of statements made in an offering circular. 
Those statements, Wittier has admitted, were untrue. The sale of a 
security by means of untrue statements is a violation of ORS 59.1 15 
and ORS 59.135. Whittier is a person liable for the sale as a seller, 
andlor as a "partner, limited liability company manager, including a 
member who is a manager, officer or director of such seller" 
pursuant to ORS 59.1 15(3). Whittier admits to being a partner and 
the manager of Wood River Partners, and of controlling its trading 
operations. All liability factors have been established. There are no 
issues left to try on the First or Second Claims For Relief. 
Supreme Cow? Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 3 (Reply Memorandurn at 3) 
Based upon the undisputed record, The district court properly granted Ilouston's motion for 
partial s m n a r y  judgment. R 161-165. 
11. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING THE 
FILING OF THE REPLY MEMORANDUM AND SHAMES AFFIDAVIT 
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BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO WHITTIER AND WHITTIER WAS 
GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PILE ANY RESPONSIVE AFFIDAVITS, BUT 
DID NOT DO SO. 
Whittier assigns as error the district court's decision to deny Whittier's Motion to Strike 
Houston's Reply Memorandum and the Declaration of Peter Shames. Whittier relies upon Rule 
56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides "[tlhe moving party may thereafter 
serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing." Rule 56 does not address 
when service is complete, because that is addressed in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which 
provides that "[slervice by mail is complete upon mailing." The parties agree that "[bloth the 
Shanles Declaration and the Reply Memorandum were served on Whittier by Federal Express 
overnight mail on January 22, 2008." Appellant's Brief at 10. The hearing was held on the 
afternoon of January 28,2008, so the brief was served six days before the hearing instead of the 
seven provided for in the rule 
Rule 56(c) grants district courts discretion to shorten the time periods. It states that "[tlhe 
court may alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good cause shown, 
may continue the hearing." See also: Benizett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 360, 647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 
1982) (motion for an exteilsioll of time to file additional affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories 
in opposition to a motion for summay judgment lies within the discretion of the district court). 
The district court was acting within the express discretion granted by Rule 56(c) in 
allowing the reply brief and declaration to be filed. In fairness, Houston had served Whittier with 
the Motion for Partial Sunm~ary Judgment on October 30,2007. R pp. 85-87. Whittier served a 
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response two and a half months later, on Friday, January 11,2008, and it was received on Monday, 
January 14. Houston took eight days to file his response, and had to address defenses relatii~g to 
the application of Oregon law that Whittier had not previously raised. Moreover, Houston's Reply 
Menioralidum was limited to ten pages. And, since Houston extended the courtesy of serving the 
Reply Memorandum and supporlillg papers by Federal Express overnight delivery, Whinier's 
actual receipt of the papers was sooner than it would have been had Houston timely served them by 
First Class Mail on January 21. Finally, with respect to the arguments in the Reply Memorandum, 
Houston's could have simply made an oral presentation at tlie hearing raising all of the arguments 
and authorities made in the Reply Memorandum. It was more helpful to the district court and 
counsel to be able to also consider the arguments iii written form. Houston acknowledges that he 
should have filed his reply a day sooner, but there was no prejudice to Whittier and the court acted 
withii its discretion ui allowing the filing. 
Whittier complaiils that the Shames Declaration "prese~ited new and different factual 
infonnation." Appellant's Brief at 12. The oiily purpose of Mr. Shames's statement was to 
address the issue of the applicatio~i of the Oregon Securities Laws to the sale of Wood River to 
Houston, an Oregon resident. Whittier had never raised that issue in his stated affirmative 
defenses, R. 59-61, or anywhere else in his Answer. Whittier was required to do so under Rule 
12(b) of the Idaho Rules, which provides that "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in 
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in 
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required." 
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Whinier was at no disadvantage as a result of the filing of the Shames's Affidavit. The 
district court gave Whittier until Februay 14,2008, to file any response to the Shames Affidavit 
i 
and the Oregon law argument. Record p. 112,77. Under Rule 43(e), The district court could 
I 
i have heard evidence supporting motions by oral testimo~iy at the hearing. Furthermore, The 
I district court scheduled another hearing to allow tlle p a i e s  to further argue the issues that the 
I 
Shanles Affidavit addressed on February 27,2008. Record p. 112, 7, 
j 
The district court exercised precisely the type of discretion that Rule 56(c) conteniplates. It 
considered the circumstances and realities of the case. It made sure that tliere was no prejudice, and 
I 
I it provided both sides with ample opportunities to submit any evidence and arguments that they 
wanted him to consider. If the district court abused its discretioli here by allowing the service of 
I 
tlie brief one day late under the circumstances of this case, then the mandate of Rule 56(c) 
i allowing district courts to "alter or shorten the time periods and requiremelits of this rule for good 
I 
cause shown" becomes lneaningless 
i 
111. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE OREGON 
SECURITIES LAWS APPLY TO THE SALE OF WOOD RIVER TO HOUSTON 
BECAUSE THE URTCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WAS THAT ALL 
SOLICITATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO HOUSTON IN OREGON. 
I A. The Oregon Law Specifically Provides That It Governs Securities Transactions 
I In Which Offers To Purchase Are Directed To Oregon. 
8 
I 
The Oregon statutes define when Oregon law applies to a securities transactioli with a 
i nexus to Oregon, and the statutory language makes clear that the Oregon securities laws 
i 1 
apply to .Mr. Houston's $2.75 million purchase of Wood River. ORS 59.335 provides: 
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(1) ORS 59.055,59.115 to 59.125,59.135 and 59.145 and subsection 
(1) of ORS 59.165 apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when: 
(a) An offer to sell is made in this state 
ORS 59.345, in turn, provides: 
(1) For the purpose of ORS 59.335, an offer to sell or to buy is made 
in this state, whether or not either warty is then present in this state, 
when the offer: 
(a) Originates from this state; or 
(b) Is directed bv the offeror to this state and received at the place to 
which it is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case of a 
mailed offer). (emphasis added) 
In Stimmel v. Skeauson, Hanznzill & Co., 41 1 F. Supp. 345 (D. Or. 1976), the court was 
faced with the issue of whether the Oregon securities laws applied to transactions in which the 
defendants were in California. There, the plaintiffs actually initiated contact with the defendants by 
visiting them in defendants' offices in California. Plaintiffs subsequently bought and sold securities 
through defendants, by telephone calls which were initiated sometiines by defendants froin 
California, and sometimes by plaintiffs from Oregon. There was no claim of fraud in that case -the 
defendants merely had not registered to sell securities in Oregon, believing that the plaintiffs were 
California residents. Still, the Stinzmel court was comnpelied to find that the Oregon securities laws 
governed the transaction because the solicitations were directed to Oregon. 
It is well recognized in securities law jurisprudence that states may enact and enforce 
securities laws for transactions that are directed to occur within their borders. Cases are 
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routinely brought by states and private litigants for violation of state securities laws by persons 
who are not found in t l~e  state. If it were otherwise, states would be powerless to regulate 
transactions directed to their citizens by non-residelits. Given the interstate nature of the vast 
majority of securities transactions, that would mean that state securities laws would be virtually 
unenforceable. Thus, in Oregon, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court held that ail Idaho 
lawyer could be liable under Oregon securities statutes for prepaxing offering documents in 
Idaho for an investment sold in Oregon. Prince v. Brydon, 307 Ore. 146, 150,764 
P.2d 1370 (1988). 
Idaho courts are no different. The Idaho Court of Appeals in State ofIdaho v. Tenizey, 
124 Idaho 243, 858 P.2d 782 (1993), affirmed a trial court's finding that a non-resident was 
liable for violatio~ls of the Idaho Securities Act. The court found, in a personal jurisdiction 
context, that an individual who prepared offering materials outside Idalio to be used in Idaho to 
solicit iiivestors was subject to Idaho jurisdiction in a claim brought by the state for violations of 
the Idaho Securities Act, i.e. 5 30-1401,even though he never came to Idaho and had no offices 
or employees there. Id. at 246. The court affirmed findings against him for violatioils of the 
Idaho Securities Act. 
The Idaho Supreme Court should affirm the application of the Oregon Securities Laws 
when a11 offering is directed to an Oregon citizen from Idaho, just as Oregon would certainly 
enforce Idaho's laws if an Idaho citizen sued a defendant located in Orego11 who directed an illegal 
offering to Idaho. This Court should give full faith and credit to the Oregon statutes as the apply to 
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Oregon citizens harmed by an individual who decides to operate a fraud out of Blaine County. 
B. The District Court Did Not Commit Error In Refusing To Strike The Shames 
Affidavit Because It Set Forth Adnzissible, Unrefuted Facts That The Wood 
River Offer Was Directed to Houston In Oregon. 
The uncontroverted evidence from the sworn statenients subinitled by Mr. Shanles and Mr 
Houston was that all of the offers sell Wood River to Mr. Iiouston were directed to hiin or his 
assistant Shames in Oregon. Record, pp. 108-109 (Shames Affidavit); Clerk's Exhibit 2,77 3 ,4  
(Houston Affidavit). The Shames Affidavit directly addresses the statutory requirements of ORS 
59.345, discussed at page 22, supra, which states that a sale occurs in Oregon when the offer is 
directed to this state and received at tile place to which it is directed. The full portion of the 
Shames Affidavit on that issue is as follows: 
I, PETER SHAMES, after being duly sworn, make the following 
statement based upon personal knowledge and wder the penalties of 
perjury: 
1. In 2004 and 2005,I was employed by Howard Houston. O n e  
of my jobs was to assist him in reviewing and ultimately subscribing 
for the Wood River Partners investment that this lawsuit is about. 
2. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Howard Houston in Suppoll 
of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Sumnary Judgment, and know the 
facts stated there regarding his purchase of the Wood River Partners 
illvestillent to be accurate. I was the one who received the original 
solicitation of the Wood River investment on Mr. Houston's behalf. 
The original solicitation for Mr. I-Iouston to invest in Wood River 
was directed to me in Hood River, Oregon, in November or 
December, 2004, for forwarding to Mr. Houston. Wood River 
representatives then sent Mr. Houston additional inforination about 
Wood River, and directed those communications to me in Oregon. 
Mr. Houstoll was also in Oregon during those times. 
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R. p. 108. 
The Shames Affidavit is adsnissible evidence on where the offer to purchase the Wood 
River investment was directed. Indeed, it is the best evidence of that fact, since Shames "was the 
one who received the original solicitation for Mr. Houston to illvest in Wood River." Those 
statements are not inadnlissible hearsay. They are made by MI.. Shames, based upon his personal 
knowledge. The fact that Shames states he reviewed the Houston affidavit and knows the facts 
stated there regarding the purchase of the Wood River partners to be accurate is also admissible, 
though not necessary for a determination on the question of where the sale occurred under Oregon 
law. The Houston Affidavit, which x7as prepared before Whittier had raised his defense of the 
inapplicability of Oregon law, established that the Wood River investments materials were sent to 
him and Shames. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Houston Affidavit 77 2,3), but it did not say where ihe 
materials were sent to. 
Whittier's reference to other paragraphs of the Affidavit are of no consequence. Shanes's 
statement that he reviewed Houston's affidavit is not hearsay. Moreover, it is included as 
background, and not a material fact for sumnary judgment purposes. 
C. Even If The District Court Had Improperly Applied Oregon Law, Any Error 
Would Have Been Harmless Because The Liability Provisions Of Idaho's 
Securities Laws Are Identical And Idaho's Damages Calculations Would Be 
More Onerous To Whittier. 
Oregon and Idaho both have adopted certain provisions of the Uniform Securities Act 
("USA"), and for that reason their liability provisions are identical for present purposes. The laws 
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of each state are reproduced below: 
ORS 59,115. Liability in connection with sale or 
successful solicitation of sale of securities 
(1) A person is liable as provided in subsection (2) of 
this section to a purcl~aser of a security if the person: 
* * * 
(b) Sells or success~lly solicits the sale of a security in 
violation of ORS 59.135 (1) or (3) or by means of an 
nntrne statement of a material fact or an oinission to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, UI light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleadimg (the buyer not knowing of the 
untruth or omission), and who does not sustain t11e burden 
of proof that the person did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth 
or omission. 
LC. 6 30-14-509. CIVIL LIABILITY 
(b) A person is liable to the purchaser 
if the person sells a security in violation of section 
30-14-301, Idaho Code, or, by means of an unuue 
statement of a material fact or an oinission to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement 
made, in light of the circumstances under which it is 
inade, not misleading, the purchaser not 
lcnowing the untrnth or omission and the seller not 
sustaining the burden of proof that the seller did not 
know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
could not have known of the untruth or omission. 
The damages provisions of the Oregon and Idaho securities acts are similar, but Idaho 
actually provides gyeater damages to plaintiffs. Both states use the USA's recessionmy measure of 
damages, but Idaho provides for mandatory attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs, while Oregon 
leaves the award of attorney fees to the discretion of the trial judge. And, the interest rate required 
by Idaho law is lo%, wllile Oregon allows only 9%. CJ: ORS 59.1 15(2) and ORS 82.010 
(providing for the rate of interest 9% per amum ~ ~ i l l z  I.C. 3 30-14-509 and 1.C. 5 
28-22-104(2)(providing for interest at the rate set by the Idaho State Treasurer). The base legal 
rate of interest for July 1,2007 - June 30,2008 for purposes of LC. 5 28-22-104(2) as set by the 
State Treasurer is 10%. See. http:/lsto.idaho.gov~epoiis/LegalRateO~terest.aspx. 
It was to Whittier's distinct advantage to proceed under the Oregon rather than the Idaho 
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statutes. The 1% interest difference between the statutes of Idaho (10%) and Oregon (9%), on an 
invest~nent of $2.75 million that began more than four years ago, is Inore than $100,000. The only 
conceivable advantage to Whittier (who has yet to satisfy any of the judgment) from inaking this 
argument is to force Houstoil to spend more money pursuing his claims. Thus, even if the district 
court did commit error in applying Oregon law (and it did not), it would have been harmless error 
because it did not affect Whittier's substantive rights. Snzith v. Mittoiz, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 
P.3d 367, 375 (2004)("an error that does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded as hamless error"). 
IV. WHITTIER'S GUILTY PLEA TO THREE FELONY COUNTS OF SECURITIES 
FRAUD PRECLUDE HIM FROM DENYING FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF 
MISREPRESENTATION AND OMISSIONS THAT ESTABLISH LIABILITY 
HERE. 
A. This Court Need Not Reach The Issue Preclusion Question To Decide This 
Case Because Summary Judgment Was Supported By Whittier's Failure To 
Deny The Controlling Facts In This Record. 
As Houston argued below, he was entitled to summary judgment both because there were 
no material facts in dispute, Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 2 (Reply 
Me~noranduin at 3), and because of the principles of issue preclusioll resulting froin TVhittiers' 
guilty plea. R. p. 100 (Plaintiffs Su~nmary Jud,ae~it Memorandun at 13). This Court need not 
even reach the issue of issue preclusion, because Whittier's failure to offer any evidence to 
contravene tlie material facts supporting the sununary judgment fully supports The district court's 
decision. See discussion supra at 17 -19, 
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Whittier's argument is premised entirely upon his contention that the district court granted 
summary judgment based solely on the Whittier guilty plea. Appellant's Brief at 15, 18. That is 
incoi~ect. The interim order of February 1,2008, granting partial summary judgment made 
findings of fact from evidence offered by Houston that were entirely independent of Whittier's 
guilty plea. For exanlple, The district court found that Houston had invested $2.75 million into 
Wood River. R. p. 11 1 (Order of February 1,2008). That finding was necessarily based upon 
Houston's unopposed statement lo tl~at effect in his affidavit. Id. at 75a. 
B. The Proper Test For Applying Issue Preclusion Resulting From A Guilty Plea 
To A Subsequent Civil Action Is Found In Anderson v. City of Pocatello. 
All of the arguments Whittier raises are resolved by the law set forth in Anderson v. Cify of 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). There; this Court considered the specific question 
of whether a criminal conviction can serve as a collateral estoppel to bar the re-litigation of an 
issue in a later civil suit involving different statutes tl1a11 those governing the criminal case. The 
court stated: 
we are constrained to hold that under the conditions described above, 
collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an issue detennined in a 
crimiilal proceeding in which the party sought to be estopped had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue 
Id. at 179, 731 P.2d at 174. 
Plaintiff there brought a civil rights action, after he was shot by police officers. In 
connection with the incident, plaintiff had been found guilty of Idaho Code 5 18-3304, 
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Intelltionally Aiming a F i r e m  at Others. The court held that, as a result of the conviction, 
plaintiff "was estopped from denying that he had pointed his shotgun at someone, at some point in 
time." Id. at 185, 731 P.2d 180. Obviously, the civil rights action was based upon a different 
statute than the criminal statute to which plaintiff had pled guilty. In that case, there remained the 
issue of whether the plaintiff was pointing his gun at the officers at the time he was shot, and for 
that reason, summary judgment was denied to the defendants, but the estoppel ruling, which was 
one of first impression in Idaho, was clear and stands today. 
The Anderson court addressed the issue of "mutuality" which has in some circunlstances 
been held to require that the parties in both cases be identical before issue preclusion applies. This 
C o w  criticized that requirement in the criminal case context, saying: 
To permit relitigation of an issue that was hlly and fairly litigated 
and lost in a prior action undermines the worthwhile purposes of the 
collateral estoppel rule witliout serving any other recogilizahle good 
purpose. This is particularly bue when tlze party sought to be 
estopped was the defeizdarzt in aprior crinzinal action resulfing in 
conviction, ivlzere tlze safeguards and burden ofprooffavored the 
defendant. 
Id. at 183, 731 P.2d at 178. (emphasis added). 
The Anderson case held that the more appropriate test is (1) whether the criminal defendant 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) are the issues in the two cases identical; and 
(3) were the issues actually decided. Id. Here, all three parts of the test were met. 
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C. Each of the Three Elements Of The Anderson Test Were Satisfied. 
1. Full and fair o ~ ~ o r t u ~ i t y  to litigate. 
Wliittier had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt of securities fraud. 
Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Robert S. Banks, Jr., Exhibit C, pp. 7 - 12 (Whittier's guilty plea 
in open court, acknowledging his understanding of the proceedings, his rights, and that he could 
receive up to 235 months in prison)). 
2. Identical Issues. 
Whittier contends that his guilty plea lo securities fraud should not prevent him from 
litigating the issue here because he pled guilty to federal securities fraud but not Oregon securities 
fraud. However, the issues and elements of the Oregon and federal laws are identical. Whittier 
pleaded guilty to Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Act in connection with Wood River. Supreme 
Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit l(Whittier's Memorandum Ln Opposition To Plaintiffs 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgrtlent, at 9). That criminal couilt is virtually identical to the First 
Claim For Relief in this case, alleging violations of ORS 59.135. The laws goveniing the criminal 
count to which la i t t ier  pleaded guilty, and the second claim for relief here, are as follows: 
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Criminal lildictinent Count 1 
17 CFR 6 240.10b-5 
It shall be unlawhl for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
coillinere, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
I (a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessay in order to make 
the stateillents made, in light of the circuinstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
First Claim For Relief 
Fraud and deceit with respect to securities or securities 
business. ORS 59.135. 
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any secuvity or 
the conduct of a securities business or for any person 
who receives any consideratioil from another person 
primarily for advising the other person as to the value of 
securities or their purchase or sale, whether through the 
issua~ce of analyses or reports or otl~eiwise: 
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; 
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business 
which ooerates or would onerate as a fraud or deceit 
The facts supporting the criminal guilty plea and those alleged here are also identical. The 
upon any person, 
conduct which Whittier admitted to is the same conduct that defrauded Mr. Houston out of $2.75 
upon any person; 
million. The Indictment alleges that Whittier engaged in a scheme to defraud Wood River 
investors. Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Robert S. Banks , Jr. In Support of Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment, Exh B, p 3, q/ 9.) The Indictment charges that Whittier falsely represented 
that Wood River pursued a broad investment strategy and that no investment would constitute 
more than tell percent of the holdings. In fact, the Indictment charged, Wood River's holdings of 
Endwave stock far exceeded ten percent. And, Whittier misrepresented to investors that the fund 
was being audited by outside auditors, when it was not. Id. 
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The complaint here describes the same fraudulent scheme, and maltes the very same 
allegations. Paragraph 14 alleges that the offering meinorandurn misrepresented that Wood River 
would make diversified iilvestn~ellts and that individual investments would be capped at ten 
percent of original costs. R. pp. 9-10. Paragraph 16 alleges that Wood River misrepresented that 
an auditor had been appointed for Wood River. R. pp. 10-1 1. Houston's Affidavit details the 
same facts: that he read the offe~ing memorandum, and was led to believe that he was investing in 
a disciplined, diversified fund. Clerk's Exhibit 2,¶7 3,4,7-9. Those are precisely the acts which 
Whittier pleaded guilty and admitted to in his criminal case. 
3. Actuallv decided. 
Whittier pleaded guilty to charges that his conduct in operating Wood River violated SEC 
Rule lob-5, which, as shown above, is the same as Oregon's ORS 59.135. Moreover, Whittier 
specifically admitted in open court in his criminal case that (a) he was general partner of Wood 
River; (b) he engaged in wrongful conduct, including intentionally coilcealing the size of the fund's 
position in Endwave, which he admits was material to investors; (c) he intentionally misled 
investors in several ways, including intentionally failing to file SEC forins to disclose Wood 
River's over-concentrated position in Endwave. R. pp. 96-97; Clerk's Exhibit 1, Exhibit C, pp. 14- 
15. ) 
Whittier never denied Houston's allegatioils of misrepresentations and omissions in 
connection with the sale of Wood River because Whittier had already admitted them in connection 
Page 32 RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
with his plea bargain with the United States. Whittier could not deny the misrepreselltations 
because lie had already aclcnowledged that they were true. 
V. WITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON FAILED TO TENDER THE WOOD 
RIVER SECURITIES TO HIM IS CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORD AND 
MISSTATES THE TENDER REQUIREMENT. 
Like other unifonn securities act states, Oregon requires that the plaintiff tender his 
securities prior to entry of judgment against a defendant in a case brought under ORS 59.115 or 
ORS 59.135. ORS 59.115 provides: 
2) The purchaser may recover: 
(a) Upon tender of the securitv, the consideration paid for the 
security, and interest from the date of payment 
Houstoll tendered his Wood River securities to Whittier prior to the entry of judgment by 
letter froin I-Iouston's counsel to Whittier's counsel on March 3, 2008, stating : 
We are tendering to you Howard Houston's rights, title and interest 
in the Wood River Partners securities, which we will deliver upon 
receipt of payment by your client or others of the full amount of the 
principal and interest stated in the proposed judgment. 
R. p. 140. 
That is all the law requires. Whittier contends tliat I-Iouston must actually deliver the 
securities to Whittier before Houston can have judgment, and that Whittier gets the securities 
without having to pay for them. As Houston explained in the district court, that is not the law. R. 
p p  139-141, 155-159. If it were, Whittier would receive an unjust windfall even after committing 
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securities fraud. Whittier has not paid anything toward this judgment. There will be some 
repayment to Wood River investors from the Wood River Receiver and the United States 
Attorney's office. (The receiver has been liquidating all of Wood River's holdings and anticipates 
a distribution). Mr. Houston hopes to recover somewhere around $200,000 - $400,000 from those 
distributions. Those amounts will partially satisfy the Judgment against Whittier, and the Final 
Judgment so provides. The Final Judgment also requires Mr. Houston to file partial satisfactions 
of judgment whenever he receives any recovery froin any other source. See: R. p. 157 (Final 
Judgment); pp. 140-141 (Banks Affidavit). 
In telling fashion, Whinier wanted the district court, and now wants the Idaho Supreme 
Court, to require Houston to deliver the rights to the Wood River securities to Whittier. The only 
reason is that Whittier wants to receive for hiniself I-Iouston's portion all of the restitution and 
recovery funds that were paid (see Order Granting Motion, Exhibit G - Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment) and that Houston anticipates and hopes will be paid by the receiver.' 
The cases that Whittier cites luerely confirm that statutory requireinent - that plaintiff must 
tender his shares to receive the consideration paid for them. Defendant's citation to a quote from 
'Whittier also contends that he is entitled to Wood River securities when others pay 
Houston. Appellants Brief at 35-36, n. 12. Houston did as he was required to do when he 
recovered any funds from other sources -he reduced the amount of judgment owing by Whittier 
by filing a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 6. A partial 
recovery by Houston does not entitle Whittier, who has paid nothing, to receive a percentage of 
any other sources of recovery. 
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Metal Tech Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., 74 Ore. App. 297, 703 P.2d 237 (1985), is incomplete 
and potentially misleading. The case does not hold that in order to tender, a prevailing party in an 
ORS 59.1 15 case must deliver the stock to the losing party, as Whittier suggests. The .Metal Tech 
appeals court concellled a standing issue, i.e., whether plaintiff had standing to bring a shareholder 
derivative claims against individual defendants. The trial court granted sumnary judgment to 
defendant on that claim. Plaintiff had no standing to pursue the derivative claims since the court 
had already granted rescission to the defendant, thus divesting plaintiff of l~ i s  tock in the company 
on whose behalf he sought to bring the derivative claims. The court of appeals reversed the 
standing decision. It noted that there was a1 unresolved counterclaim against plaintiff for 
violations of ORS 59.1 15 in connection with the transaction that had already been rescinded. If 
defendants prevailed on that claim, they would have to tender their shares back to plaintiff, and he 
would then acquire future standing to bbrillg his derivative claims. Tlle tender requirement of ORS 
59.11 5(2)(a) were not at issue in the case; indeed, the court reversed a grant of summary judgment 
on the statutory claim, and remanded it for trial. And, it was clear there that plaintiff would re- 
acquire the stock in order to obtain standing to pursue his derivative claims. Neither Metal Tech, 
nor any other case in Oregon, holds that a plaintiff must deliver his securities without payinent 
before he can obtain a judgment. 
The rescissionary measure of damages in the blue sky laws allow a plaintiff to unwind the 
transaction. To put the parties in the positions they were in prior to the transaction, as rescission 
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requires, a plaintiff tenders the security back, and the defendant retuns the money paid. The 2002 
Uniforn~ Securities Act itself makes that clear. It provides: 
SECTION 509. CIVIL LIABILITY 
(a)(l) The purchaser may maintain an action to recover the consideration paid for 
the security, less the amount of any income received on the security, and interest [at 
the legal rate of interest] from the date of the purchase, costs, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees detern~ined by the court, upon the tender of the security, or for actual 
danlages as provided in paragraph (3). 
(2) The tender referred to in paragraph (1) may be made any time before entry of , , - - - . .  
judgment. Tender requires onlv notice in a record of ownership of the securitv and 
willingness to exchange the securitv for the amount specified. 
(Emphasis added.) A copy of the relevant pages of the 2002 Uniform Securities Act is a part of the 
record at R. p. 158-159. 
The words "tender" and "deliver" are distinct throughout the law. Another exsunple in 
Oregon is ORS 20.080, which provides for attorney fees in small cases unless defendant had 
previously tendered the damages. It provides as follows: 
(1) In any action for damages for an injury or wrong to the person or 
property, or both, of another where the amount pleaded is $ 5,500 or 
less, and the plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and 
allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to 
be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the 
action, if the cou-t finds that wriaen demand for the payment of such 
claim was made on the defendant not less thail 10 days before the 
commencement of the action. . . However, no attorney fees shall be 
allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered 
to the plaintiff, prior to the commencemeilt of the action . . . an 
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amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 
As the courts have recognized in that context, "tei~der" refers to an ' 'ofer of settlement." 
F ~ e s k  v. K~aenzer, 337 Ore. 513,524-525 (Or. 2004)(enlphasis added). The defendant need not 
deliver payment to the plaintiff in order to comply with the statute. And, the defendant can 
condition the tender upon the delivery of a release by the plaintiff. Id. 
Whittier's argument makes no sense, and there is no Oregon case that supports such a 
nonsensical position. I11 his reading of ORS 59.1 15(2)(a), Iloustoil clearly has an obligation to 
tender his securities upon payment for them, but he has no obligation to deliver them until he is 
paid. If it were otherwise, whenever there were multiple defendants in a securities case, any one of 
them could accept the tender, take the securities without paying for them, and claim the proceeds 
from any recovery froin any of the other defendants. 
VI. WHITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON DID NOT MOVE FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES HAS NO SUPPORT IN THE 
RECORD BECAUSE HOUSTON SPECIFICALLY MOVED FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON TWO CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND INTRODUCED ALE THE 
REQUIRED EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF RESCISSIONARY 
DAMAGES. 
Houston moved for summary judgment on his first claim for relief for violations of ORS 
59.135 and on his second claim for relief for violations of ORS 59.1 15. R. pp. 85-87. In support 
of that motion, Houstoli submitted an affidavit ill which he detailed the dates and amounts of his 
investment. Clerk's Exhibit 2 , 7  6. (Affidavit of Howard Houston). 
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Houston's first and second claims for relief award statutory damages based upon a theory of 
rescission. ORS 59.1 15(2) provides: 
2) The purchaser may recover: 
(a) Upon tender of the security, the consideration paid for the 
security, and interest from the date of payment equal to the greater of 
the rate of interest specified in ORS 82.010 for judgments for the 
payment of money or the rate provided in the security if the security 
is an interest-bearing obligation, less any amount received on the 
security 
Houston's evidence allowed the district court to calculate the amount of damages to which 
Houston was entitled. 
Despite those facts, Whittier appeals the decision, arguing that Houston never requested 
s m m y  judgment on the issue of damages. Although he was given ample opportunity to do so, 
Whittier never challenged the dates or amounts of Houston's investments, because there was no 
basis to do so. 
Whittier's argument is frivolous. As the district court correctly ruled: 
Houston moved for summay judgment based upon, among other 
things, the affidavit of Howard Houston filed on October 30,2007. 
That affidavit clearly sets forth that amounts that Houston paid to 
Wood River Partners. The amount and timing of these payment was 
never controverted by defendant Whittier. . . [Pllaintiff Houston 
never limited his motion solely to the issue of liability. Indeed, he 
moved for summary judgment on his first and second claims set forth 
in his complaint. Accordingly, a finding pursuant to Rule 56(d) as to 
the amoulit and timing of payments made by Houston, which formed 
the basis of the damages claim, was appropriate upon sulnmay 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in this brief, the Respondent respecthlly requests this Court to 
affirm the district court's judgment, and to award the respondent his attorney fees and costs on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted on December 4,2008 
BANI$? LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
Ned Williamson 
Attorney At Law 
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